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COMMENT 
GETTING THE LIGHTS BACK ON: 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE MARYLAND ENERGY SERVICE 
QUALITY AND RELIABILITY ACT'S IMP ACT ON 
UTILITY LIABILITY AND CONSUMER RIGHTS 
By: Elizabeth Payne* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the midst of one of the most ferocious winter storms in Mid-Atlantic history, thousands of Washington D.C. area residents sat helplessly as 
their homes suddenly went dark. 1 Power lines became victims of the storm, 
unable to survive the barrage of rapidly falling wet snow. As households 
huddled together in the dark, watching the snow and wind create white-out 
conditions, many assumed the power would be back by morning. 
In reality, at least four days came and went before power was finally 
restored to many neighborhoods? Some families viewed the long blackout 
as a minor inconvenience, utilizing fireplaces and generators, or self-
evacuating to places that had electricity. For the less fortunate, the outage 
resulted in long days of near-freezing temperatures in darkened apartments, 
cut off from the world. These unlucky ones, often lower-income families, 
had no fireplaces or generators, and could not leave until the city's public 
. d 3 transportatIOn system reopene . 
The situation worsened as a second blizzard slammed into the area just 
three days after the first storm, and before power returned to many D.C. 
* Elizabeth Payne received her juris doctorate from the University of Baltimore 
School of Law in May of2013. Elizabeth would like to personally thank her Faculty 
Advisor, Professor William Hubbard of the University of Baltimore Law School, for 
his advice, feedback, and patience with her comment and relentless stream of 
questions. 
1 See Joe Stephens, Pepco Struggles to End Power Outages, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 
2011, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/pepco-struggles-to end-
fower-outages/20 1110 1130/ AB3RDME _story .html. 
See id. 
3 The blizzards resulted in shutting down all local bus routes, along with 40 above-
ground Metro stations, and remained closed for days. See Carlos Hamann, Powerfol 
Blizzard Shuts Down u.s. Capital, GOOGLE NEWS (Feb. 5, 2010), 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ ALeqM5j3 HVBhfkkHN4c9TIIAxNk 
xjbROA. Some of the above-ground stations serve some ofD.C.'s poorest 
neighborhoods, including Branch Avenue, Suitland, Capitol Heights, and New 
Carrollton. See WMATA, http://wmata.com/getting_around/SnowMap.pdf(last 
revised May 23, 2007) (showing which stations close after eight inches of snow 
accumulates). 
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neighborhoods. Many residents learned electricity would not be restored for 
a week, and the Washington Post's online comment boards filled with 
complaints by furious area residents.4 The majority of the comments came 
from D.C. and Maryland residents, who constituted the Potomac Electric 
Power Company's ("PEPCO") customer base. 5 Where is PEPCO, they 
asked, and why is it taking so long? How could Virginia's power companies 
seemingly restore power faster, despite having more outages?6 How were 
people expected to survive in dark, cold homes, especially through another 
blizzard? 
While this scenario might seem extreme, anyone who weathered the 2010 
"Snowmageddon" storms in southern Maryland lived through such an 
ordeal. 7 Thousands in Maryland faced days without power after the 
February 2010 blizzards that delivered a one-two punch and dumped over 
two feet of snow on the D.C. area in less than a week. 8 Then, after a series 
of violent thunderstorms tore through the region in August 2010, PEPCO 
customers in Montgomery and Prince George's counties lost power for 
days.9 The company claimed the storms took it by surprise, but angry 
residents demanded accountability.lO 
4 See Christopher Dean Hopkins, How Have Elected Leaders Handled the Snow 
Storm? Readers Respond, WASH. POST MD. POLL BLOO (Feb. 8,2010,4:23 PM), 
http://voices.washingtonpost.comlannapolis/20 I 0/02lhow _have_elected_leaders _han 
dl.html. 
5 Id.; see Stephens, supra note I; see Mary Pat Flaherty, In Storm, Pepco Last to 
Seek Aid, WASH. POST, Jan. 28,2011, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.comlnational/in-storm-pepco-last -to-seek-
aid/2011/0Il27/ABTi4LE_story.html. 
6 See Preliminary Snow Totals Ending Feb. 6,2010, NAI'L WEATHER SERV., 
http://www.erh.noaa.gov/lwx/events/?event=20100206 (last visited Apr. 2, 2013). 
The NWS reported the following snowfall totals: 27.5 inches at American University 
in D.C., 27 inches in Bethesda, Md., 25 inches in College Park, Md.; 28 inches in the 
Ballston neighborhood of Arlington, Va.; and 32.4 inches at Dulles International 
Airport in Loudoun County, Va. /d. 
7 See Jason Samenow, Amazing Mid-Atlantic Snow Statistics, WASH. POST CAPITAL 
WEATHER BLOO (Feb. 12,2010, 12:30 PM), 
http://voices.washingtonpost.coml capitalweathergang/20 10/02/amazing_ mid-
atlantic_snow_stat.html. The Capital Weather Blog, a popular weather forecasting 
site, created the Snowpocolypse (December 2009 blizzard), Snomaggedon (February 
5-6 20 I 0 blizzard) and Snoverkill (February 9-10, 20 I 0 blizzard) nicknames, which 
were then picked up by national news organizations. 
8 See Flaherty, supra note 5. Over 205,000 PEPCO customers lost power by the end 
of the 2010 blizzards. Virginia's Dominion Power reported 140,000 outages by the 
end of the second storm, and BG&E reported 135,000. /d. 
9 See Joe Stephens &.Aaron C. Davis, Pepco Defends Post-Storm Efforts at Hearing, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 18,2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-
dynicontent/artic1eI201O/08/17/AR2010081705868.html; see Dan Morse, Editorial, 
Pepco Acknowledges Response Problems, WASH. POST, July 28,2010, available at 
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This scenario is not unique to the Maryland suburbs surrounding 
Washington. Baltimore Gas and Electric ("BG&E") also received heavy 
criticism for its storm responses, which included a week-long restoration 
after 2011's Hurricane Irene. ll Nor is this problem unique to Maryland, as 
Connecticut suffered from similar problems after the surprise 2011 
"Snowtober" nor'easter. 12 Many customers, tired of throwing out spoiled 
food, living in cold homes, or forced to move to hotels, offices, or anyplace 
warm, undoubtedly wondered how such a slow response could be legal. 
Does the law afford them any rights as customers? Are these companies 
being held to any standard of responsibility by legislators or regulators? 
After facing a massive backlash from both local media and constituents, 
Maryland legislators took action.13 In early 2011, the General Assembly 
passed the Maryland Electricity Service Quality and Reliability Act 
("ESQR,,).14 The statute, which went into effect on July 1, 2012, required 
the Maryland Public Service Commission ("PSC") create and hold Maryland 
utility companies to new reliability standards. 15 Special requirements and 
reports for weather-related outages may also be enacted. 16 But what will this 
law actually do? Why are power companies in Maryland taking days to get 
http://voices.washingtonpost.comllocal-breaking-news/maryland/pepco-outages-
continue-to-decl.html. 
10 See Stephens & Davis, supra note 9. The D.C. Metro area typically has severe 
and damaging thunderstorms in the late summer months. See id. 
11 See Editorial, Our Say: PSC needs to look into BGE efforts following Irene, THE 
CAPITAL (Annapolis, Md.), Sept. 7,2011, available at 
http://capitalgazette.comlnews/our-say-psc-needs-to-look-into-bge-efforts-
following/article_d0b4b270-fee3-56a5-b7de-3acf445259bb.html?mode=print. 
12 See Dave Collins & Stephen Singer, October Snowstorm Outages Remain, 
Thousands In Connecticut Enter Second Week Without Power, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Nov. 7, 2011, 9:26 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.coml2011111107/connecticut-
outages-enter-second-week _ n _1079489.html. A surprise October Nor'Easter 
dropped almost a foot of snow on New England, leaving approximately 830,000 
Connecticut homes without power. After restoration efforts took almost two weeks, 
many residents demanded government action, much like Maryland residents did after 
the 2009-2010 blizzards. See id.; see Morse, supra note 9. 
13 See generally MD. GEN. ASSEMB., DEP'T. OF LEGIS. SERV., Fiscal and Policy Note, 
H.B. 391, 20 II Leg., 428th Sess. (Md. 2011) (hereinafter "Fiscal Policy Note"). 
14 MD. ELEC. SERVo QUALITY AND RELIABILITY ACT, H.B. 391, 2011 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Md. 2011) (codified as MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. § 7-213 (West 2011)); see 
Bill to Penalize Utilities if They Fall Below Standards, WBAL-TV, Feb. 4,2011, 
http://www.wbaltv.comlnews/26751498/detail.html (on file with author); Fiscal 
Policy Note, supra note 13. 
15 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13. ESQR requires that the PSC base the new 
reliability and service quality standards on national ranking systems, and creates a 
state goal that each electric company provide the highest levels of service quality and 
reliability in a cost-effective manner. Fiscal Policy Note, sup;~·~ote i3, at 1-2"-
16 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 2, 4. 
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the lights back on? Why does it seem that Maryland's utilities move slower 
than those in Virginia? Most importantly, what legal rights do citizens have, 
and can they be compensated for their damages? 
This comment addresses these questions and analyzes the new 
requirements set forth by ESQR. Section II examines the previous statutory 
and regulatory requirements Maryland imposed on electric utilities, and 
explores whether the current policy of emphasizing low electricity rates is 
the best way to ensure customer satisfaction and reliable service. Section III 
then looks at case law to see how the courts have dealt with claims relating to 
utilities. This section then examines ESQR as part of the legal framework 
and addresses how the statute will correct previously identified problems. 
Part IV compares Maryland's laws and regulations to Virginia's, to see if 
statutory and legal differences explain the differing utility response times 
after the storms. Finally, the comment concludes with considering whether 
ESQR is the best method of fixing slow utility response times. 
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
A. The Regulatory Scheme 
Understanding electric utility company liability issues requires a basic 
knowledge of how utility regulation works. Power companies were 
originally privately owned corporations regulated by the free market. 17 
These companies began forming "natural monopolies" due to the costs of 
providing electric power to customers. 18 A natural monopoly exists when 
only one company could supply all of the demand for the area it serves. 19 
Public utility companies, including electric, telephone, and water services, 
1 1· 20 are common natura monopo les. 
As these natural monopolies formed, self-regulation through the free 
market faltered. 21 The reliabili~ and quality of electric service dropped, 
causing customer dissatisfaction. 2 The government soon intervened, seeing 
electric company monopolies as necessary, but also needing outside 
regulation.23 The State protected citizens by keeping costs low and requiring 
utilities to advance certain legislative goals for the public's benefit.24 In 
return, states protected the utilities' profits through the creation of favorable 
17 See John L. Rudy, Limitation of Liability Clauses in Public Utility Tariffs: Is the 
Rationalefor State-Sponsored Indemnity Still Valid?, 52 BUFF. L. REv. 1379, 1390 
(2004). 
18 See id. 
19 Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STANFORD L. REv. 
548 (1969) . 
. 20 See id. 
21 See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1391. 
22 Id. at 1390. 
23 I d. at 1391. 
24 See id. at 1392. 
2013] Getting the Lights Back On 137 
legislation.25 State legislatures crafted regulatory systems, governed by an 
oversight commission, to maintain the fragile balancing of regulatory 
benefits. 26 
Service agreements called "tariffs" lay at the heart of the relationship 
between public utility companies and state regulatory committees?7 These 
tariffs are essentially standard contracts, stating how much a power company 
may charge, along with other service terms.28 Power companies create these 
tariffs, and commonly use them as a sheltering mechanism through the 
inclusion of protective terms and conditions?9 
One key tariff protection is the liability indemnity clause ("LIe"), which 
most power companies write into its tariffs. 30 LIes block lawsuits by 
stipulating when a company can be found liable for its negligence. 31 
Railroad companies originally created LIes to allocate risks between the 
company and its customers.32 In 1884, the Supreme eourt upheld a railroad 
company LIe, and opened the door for other utilities to adopt their use.33 
LIes are now a commonly used contractual safeguard for utility 
. 34 compames. 
B. A Valuation o/Goals 
Regulatory systems do not simply change the state-utility relationship, but 
allow states to set a utility's rates in exchange for government protection.35 
Most of the company's practices also fall under the state's power, where they 
are usually regulated by an administrative agency.36 Regulatory commission 
oversight ensures utility companies operate in compliance with the state's 
legislative goals. 37 Such goals supposedly protect states and consumers 
while guaranteeing regulated utilities do not engage in harmful or 
irresponsible practices.38 
Legislatures tend to focus on three goals for energy utilities: 
environmental conservation, service reliability or quality, and electricity 
25 I d. at 1391. 
26 See Rudy, supra note 17, at 13 91. 
27 I d. at 1380 n.8. 
28 I d. at 1380 n.8. 
29 I d. at 1385. 
30 I d. at 1381 n.lO; see infra at Part C for further analysis on LICs. 
31 I d. at 1383-84. 
32 I d. at 1382 (citing Hart v. Pa. R.R. Co., 112 U.S. 331, 343 (1884». 
33 Rudy, supra note 17 at 1383-84 (citing Hart, 112 U.S. at 343). 
34 See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1382. 
35 See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1392. 
36 Id. at 1391-92. 
37 Id. at 1392 n.70. 
38 !d. at 139l. 
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affordability.39 Theoretically, a state could equally emphasize each of these 
goals. In practice, most states pick one as the top priority and rank the other 
goals accordingly.4o This necessary valuation results from the conflict each 
of these goals creates with another.41 
For example, more environmentally friendly energy resources tend to cost 
more, as they require updatin~ older, less "green" infrastructure, with newer, 
more expensive technology. 2 In addition, few environmentally friendly 
power sources can produce the same amount of voltage as a traditional 
fossil-fuel power plant.43 Nuclear power, long considered cleaner and as 
productive as traditional electricity sources, remains highly controversial due 
to concerns over high construction costs.44 These economic issues make 
nuclear power simply too expensive for some states in light of concerns over 
nuclear fuel storage and accidents.45 
The conflict between service reliability-quality ("SRQ") and affordability 
goals seems obvious at first, but these clear-cut lines vanish after examining 
the real costs and benefits.46 Many programs that raise SRQ levels require 
spending money, such as tree-trimming programs and upgrading 
infrastructure well before storms hit.47 Pre-storm preparation entails hiring 
sub-contractors, putting more workers on duty, and paying overtime and 
39 I d. at 1407-08. 
40 I d. at 1410. 
41 See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1408. 
42 See Douglas 1. Heinold, Retail Wheeling: Is Competition Among Energy Utilities 
an Environmental Disaster, or Can it be Reconciled With Integrated Resource 
Planning?, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 301,313 (1996). 
43 !d. at 313-14. 
44 !d. at 329-30. This controversy is unlikely to end soon with the recent tragedy at 
Japan's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. See Brian Wingfield, NRC Staff to Lay 
Out Next Steps on Plant Safety, Official Stays, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 12, 
2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/20 12-0 1-12/nrc-staff-to-Iay-out-next-
steps-on-plant-safety-official-says.html. The Japanese tsunami and resulting nuclear 
meltdown caused the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to review all Fukushima-style 
reactors used in U.S. nuclear power plants. Id. Additionally, the recent Virginia 
earthquake took Virginia Power's Lake Anna Nuclear Power Plant offline after 
concerns over damage arose. Press Release, Dominion Virginia Power Begins 
Restart of North Anna Power Station, DOMINION POWER, Nov. 11,2011, 
http://dom.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=1053. In light of these recent 
events, many Americans were reminded of the dangers of nuclear power. See 
Christopher Joyce, After Fukushima: A Changing Climate for Nuclear, NPR (Dec. 
24,2011,5:10 AM), http://www.npr.org/2011l12/241144194064/after-fukushima-a-
changing-climate-for-nuclear. 
45 See Heinold, supra note 42, at 308-09. 
46 See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1415; see Steven Ferrey, Reliability and Blackouts, 1 
1. INDEP. POWER § 10:3.1, 10-30.2-3 (2011). 
47 See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1415; see Ferrey, supra note 46, at 10-34. 
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other costs so that ample response teams are available to repair damaged or 
downed wires.48 
On the other hand, power companies that do not practice regular tree-
trimming and upgrading have higher chances of suffering from outages.49 
Storms regularly knock overhanging limbs onto wires or inflict water 
damage on unprotected or worn equipment. 50 This reality highlights a 
logical flaw in electric companies' favorite argument against higher SRQ 
goals? Massive service restoration projects after storms sometimes cost 
consumers as much, if not more, than SRQ optimization programs. 52 
Despite SRQ programs potentially lowering utility expenses in the long 
run, many states prioritize affordability above SRQ goals. 53 Electricity is a 
basic need.54 State governments thus set goals to maximize affordability.55 
Keeping costs low validates regulatory programs and agreements, along with 
any protections for utilities therein.56 Utility companies argue that making 
affordability the primary goal protects the most vulnerable consumers while 
allowing for greater economic growth overall. 57 Proponents claim lower 
rates attract new business owners, industry, and may even bring in new 
residents. 58 
However, high SRQ levels also lure new businesses and homeowners. 59 
For example, some businesses may choose their location based on a need to 
minimize power outages that damage sensitive equipment. 60 Many 
technological industries require constant electric service, and outages take 
entire servers hosting cloud technology for international clients offline.61 
Widespread power outages cost millions, even when they affect a small 
48 See Ferrey, supra note 46, at 10-30.5-6. 
49 See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1411. 
50 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 5. 
51 See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1415. 
52 Id. 
53 See generally Ferrey, supra note 46; see also Rudy, supra note 17, at 1398; see 
also Heinold, supra note 42, at 303; see also Liability of Elec. Power Companies for 
Injury or Damages Resulting from Problems in the Delivery of Electric Power, 82 
Md. P.S.C. 92,101 (1991) (hereinafter "In re Singer"). 
54 See Ferrey, supra note 46, at 10-30.3. 
55 See generally Ferrey, supra note 46. 
56 See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1398. 
57 !d. 
58 !d. 
59 See generally Singer Co., Link Simulation Sys. Div. v. Bait. Gas & Elec. Co., 79 
Md. App. 461,468,558 A2d 419, 422 (1989); see generally Ferrey, supra note 46. 
60 See generally Singer, 79 Md. App. at 468, 558 A.2d at 422. 
61 See id. For an example of the widespread effects ofa cloud server outage, see 
Sharon Gaudin, Amazon Cloud Outage Staggers Into Day 2, COMPUTERWORLD 
(Apr. 22, 2011, 12:01 PM), 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9216083/Amazon_cloud _outage_staggers_ 
into_Day_2_ (discussing the Amazon Cloud Services outage in 2011). 
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area.62 California's scheduled rolling blackouts cost the Silicon Valley area 
$75 million a day.63 The August 2003 blackout resulted in $1 billion in 
losses for New York City's businesses. 64 In today's globalized, 
technologically-dependent world, power outages are serious business.65 
C. Liability Indemnity Clauses and Service Quality Issues 
Electric company LICs focus on service interruptions reSUlting in a loss of 
power, especially due to "acts of God," because the nature of electric power 
puts the delivery method of exposed wires at the whim of the weather. 66 
Power lines hang, dangerously exposed to winds, tree branches, and snow.67 
Even underground wiring is vulnerable to flooding. 68 Power companies, 
unable to control the weather, rightly fear being held liable for outages 
outside of their control. 69 
There are reasonable actions power companies can take to pregare for 
major storms, and most power companies prepare well in advance. Many 
power companies routinely trim tree branches away from wires.71 Most 
power companies prepare for expected weather events through extensive 
planning, including calling in extra help ahead of the storm.72 But regulated 
companies find themselves stuck between the proverbial rock and hard 
place.73 Storm-preparation programs cost money, but state-set electricity 
rates block utility companies from raising their rates to pay for such 
programs. 74 Hence, electric companies insert strict LICs into their tariffs, 
with the state's approval so long as affordability is maximized.75 
62 See Ferrey, supra note 46, at lO-30.3. 
63 See Ferrey, supra note 46, at 10-30.6. 
64 See Ferrey, supra note 46, at 10-30.5. 
6S See Ferrey, supra note 46, at 10-30.5, 10-30.6, 10-33. 
66 See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1385. LIes often mirror force majeure clauses in 
traditional contracts. Id. For an analysis offorce majeure clauses in utility 
contracts, see Jennifer Sniffen, In the Wake of the Storm: Nonperformance of 
Contract Obligations Resultingfrom a Natural Disaster, 31 NOVA L. REv. 551,573 
F007). 
7 See generally Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13; see Stephens, supra note I. 
68 See generally Overhead and Underground Electrical Service FAQs, FLA. POWER 
& LIGHT, http://www.fpl.comlfaqs/underground.shtml. (last visited Feb. 28, 20l3). 
69 See Ferrey, supra note 46; see Rudy, supra note 17, at 1393-94. 
70 See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1415. Regulatory commissions require utility 
companies make reasonable preparations when weather forecasts show incoming 
storms that may cause outages. For examples oflocal power company storm 
preparation, see Kate Ryan, Area Power Companies Prep for Irene, wrop (Aug. 
27,2011,9:03 AM), http://www.wtop.coml?nid=41&sid=25l3520. 
71 See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1414-16. 
72 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 2-3. 
73 See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1410. 
74 !d. at 1413. 
75Id. 
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D. LIes and Affordability Goals in Maryland 
In Maryland, the Public Service Commission (PSC) oversees state 
regulation of all utilities.76 Many Maryland power companies, including 
PEPCO and BG&E, fall under the PSC's oversight.77 Maryland is not, 
however, a purely regulatory scheme. 78 Maryland recently adopted a 
competitive cooperative market system ("co-op"), meaning some utilities 
still fall under state regulation, but other utilities offer electricity service at 
competitive market rates. 79 These unregulated co-op merchants often offer 
environmentally-friendly power sources, for a price.8o While the consumer 
buys the power directly from the co-op company, the regulated utility 
company still provides the equipment actually transferring electric power 
(Le., the power lines and transformers).81 The co-op company pays a usage 
fee to the regulated company, taken out of the customer's payment. 82 This 
creates two kinds of markets at work in Maryland, one subject to regulation, 
another impacted by it. 83 
III. THE JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY POWER STRUGGLE OVER 
UTILITY NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY 
A. Gross Negligence and Utility Liability in Maryland 
In Maryland, utility providers' tariff LICs may contract away all liability , 
with the exception of "gross negligence.,,84 Gross negligence is an oft-used 
legal term, but subject to a variety of interpretations. 85 The standard's 
gravity allows it to sometimes overcome contributory negligence, which bars 
76 MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. Cos. § 2-112, 113 (West 2011); 9 M.L.E. Elee. Co. § 
3, Electric Companies. 
77 See 9 M.L.E. Elee. Co. § 3, Electric Companies. 
78 See 9 M.L.E. Elec. Co. § 3, supra note 78. 
79 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. Cos. § 7-504 (West 2011); see Rudy, supra note 
17, at 1381, 1408. 
80 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. Cos. § 7-504; see Rep. Jim Cooper, Policy Essay, 
Electric Co-Operatives: From New Deal to Bad Dean, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 335, 
337 (2008). 
81 See Cooper, supra note 81, at 336. 
82 See Choosing Your Residential Electricity Supplier, MD. ATT'y. GENERAL, 
http://www.oag.state.md.us/energy/ (last visited on Jan. 13,2012). 
83 See 9 M.L.E. Elee. Co. § 3, supra note 78. 
84 See Singer, 79 Md. App. at 479, 558 A.2d at 427; see Randolph Stuart Sergent, 
Gross, Reckless, Wanton, and Indifferent: Gross Negligence in Maryland Civil Law, 
30 U. BALT. L. REv. 1,42 (2000). 
85 See Sergent, supra note 85, at 2. 
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liability claims in Maryland. 86 However, the standard also makes a 
successful lawsuit against an electric company highly unlikely, and previous 
PSC actions ensured LlCs will protect utilities from all but the most 
. I' 87 egregIOus calms. 
Gross negligence, under Maryland law, requires severe recklessness and 
actual knowledge of the potential risks by the acting party.88 Maryland 
courts require showing substantial risk of foreseeable and almost certain 
harm to another's person or property.89 The actor must also have a "manifest 
duty" to the endangered party.90 In the electric utility context, this duty 
springs from the contractual relationship between companies and their 
customers.91 
The analysis does not stop after determining reasonable foreseeability and 
potential harm.92 Maryland courts also look at underlying social policies in 
determining gross negligence.93 Here, power companies protect themselves 
through the PSC and their tariffs.94 Maryland's regulatory scheme strives to 
achieve affordable electricity access for as many people as possible.95 The 
PSC places far less emphasis on quality and reliability standards because 
efforts to achieve these goals can limit access and raise costs.96 Similarly, 
liability for outage damages will raise electricity costs, especially after major 
storms.97 Maryland electric companies commonly argue this point when 
faced with a suit, and win.98 The PSC's social policies effectively shield 
86 See Minor v. State, 326 Md. 436, 441, 605 A.2d 138, 140 (1992); see Singer, 79 
Md. App. at 480, 558 A.2d at 428. The electric utility standard is indistinguishable 
from the "willful and wanton" standard for trespassers under Maryland law, a 
common area of electric utility liability claims. Sergent, supra note 85, at 2. The 
contributory negligence doctrine creates an affirmative defense to a negligence claim 
by showing the plaintiff's aggrieved or partially caused their injury. See Sergent, 
supra note 85, at 2. 
87 See Minor, 326 Md. at 441, 605 A.2d at 140; see also Singer, 79 Md. App. at 480, 
558 A.2d at 428; see also In re Singer, supra note 53, at 92. 
88 See Minor, 326 Md. at 441, 605 A.2d at 140; see also Sergent, supra note 85, at 
56-58. 
89 See Minor, 326 Md. at 441,605 A.2d at 140; see Sergent, supra note 85, at 58-59. 
90 See Sergent, supra note 85, at 42. 
91 I d. at 41-42 (citing Marriott Corp. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 124 Md. 
App. 463,467-68, 723 A.2d 454,457 (1998)). 
92 See Sergent, supra note 85, at 58-59. 
93 I d. at 64-65. 
94 I d. at 41-42. 
95 Singer, 79 Md. App. at 479,558 A.2d at 427. 
96 I d. 
97 See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1393-94. 
98 See, e.g., Premier Parks, Inc. v. BaIt. Gas & Elec. Co., 37 F. Supp. 2d 732, 735 (D. 
Md. 1999); Singer, 79 Md. App. at 477-78,558 A.2d at 427. 
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utility companies from liability.99 This creates little incentive for utility 
companies to pursue adequate storm response programs or SRQ initiatives. 
B. Singer and the PSC: Who has the Final Say? 
Only one Maryland case shows the state courts attempting to carve out a 
limited area of legal sanctuary for customers hurt by a utility's negligence. 
In Singer v. BG&E, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland limited the 
amount of liability an LIC could block.lOO The case centered on frequent 
power outages caused by lightning-damaged electrical equipment owned by 
BG&E. 101 The outages affected Singer's industrial machinery that needed a 
constant electric supply, and so Singer informed BG&E of the outages. \02 
BG&E knew a damaged ~ower station caused the outages, but failed to take 
any action to repair it. I 3 Singer sued, alleging breach of contract and 
1· 104 neg Igence. 
Singer brought multiple issues to the court's attention, the first being 
whether the Maryland VCC's implied warranty for goods applied to 
electricity. 105 The Court, following other jurisdictions, ruled electricity only 
becomes a good under the VCC when it reaches the meters on a house 
because it is not converted for household use until that point. 106 While this 
limited any breach of contract claims, the Singer court nevertheless held that 
BG&E may be liable for the outages. I07 BG&E's tariffLIC limited BG&E's 
liability to "willful default or neglect on its part," and excluded liability for 
weather-caused interruptions or anything "beyond its control."I08 BG&E 
argued for a narrow interpretation, stating that it should only be found liable 
when plaintiffs could prove that BG&E acted with actual malice. 109 
99 See, e.g., Premier Parks, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 735; Singer, 79 Md. App. at 480,558 
A.2d at 428. 
100 See Singer, 79 Md. App. at 480, 558 A2d at 428. 
101Id. at 468-69, 558 A.2d at 422-23. 
102 !d. 
103 !d. at 469, 558 A.2d at 423. 
104 Id. at 465,558 A2d at 421. 
105Id. The UCC implied warranty rule applies guaranteed warranties of fitness and 
merchantability to all goods, which some states interpret to include electricity. See 
generally, Gary D. Spivey, Annotation, Electricity, Gas or Water Furnished by 
Public Utility as "Goods" Within Provisions of Uniform Commercial Code, Article 
2 On Sales, 48 AL.R. 3d 1060. For the Maryland DCC's implied warranty 
provisions, see MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 2-314, 2-315 (West 2011). 
106 See Singer, 79 Md. App. at 471-72, 558 A2d at 424. 
107Id. at 480, 558 A2d at 428. Singer appealed from a summary judgment decision 
in the circuit court, which the Court of Special Appeals returned the case for a final 
decision. Id. 
108 See id. at 477,558 A.2d at 427. 
109 See id. at 477,558 A2d at 426. 
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However, the court interpreted the LIC clause as requiring "willful default" 
or "willful neglect" by consciously failing to fulfill a duty to a customer. 1I0 
Singer's holding thus broadened the legal responsibilities of Maryland power 
companies.1I1 
BG&E based its argument of allowing utility liability only for malicious 
conduct on the policy goals of the Maryland PSC. ll2 The company claimed 
any broader liability would result in electricity rates rising, undermining the 
State's goal of maximum affordability.1l3 Furthermore, BG&E admitted that 
outages and interruptions were part of the electricity business and 
unavoidable. 1I4 BG&E could not stop weather from damaging electricity 
delivery systems, it argued, and their tariffs, approved by the PSC, accounted 
for storm related damages by barring this area of liability. liS 
The Court of Special Appeals disagreed. 116 Singer suggested that 
weather-related damages to power systems might fall under a company's 
control if the company failed to fix the problems.117 At that point, a utility 
engaged in willful neglect of its duty to customers and thus became liable. 118 
Had Singer remained controlling law, the Maryland General Assembly 
may not have needed to later create the ESQR. 119 Perhaps because Singer 
left utility companies like BG&E and PEP CO unhappy, the PSC reviewed 
the case and the limitations on LICs in general. 120 The subsequent PSC 
opinion slammed the door shut on any broader interpretation of utility 
liability. 121 
The PSC invoked its regulatory authority to address whether there should 
be a uniform standard of liability, and whether utilities should be able to 
II0Id. at 480, 558 A.2d at 428. 
III See generally id. at 480, 558 A.2d at 427; see In re Singer, supra note 53, at 93. 
112 See Singer, 79 Md. App. at 478-79,558 A.2d at 427. 
113 See id. at 479, 558 A.2d at 427. 
114 See id. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals agreed that weather-related 
outages and interruptions could not be totally avoided and initially fell outside a 
power company's control. !d. 
15 See id. 
116 See id. at 428, 558 A.2d at 428. 
117 See Singer, 79 Md. App. at 480, 558 A.2d at 428. The Maryland Court of Special 
Appeals remanded the case, declining to make such a decision themselves. Id. 
II See id. As previously mentioned, Singer dealt with the after-effects of weather-
related damages, and not an actual case involving a weather-caused outage. Id. 
However, Singer certainly suggested that at some point, a utility company's duty to 
mitigate outages arises, even when weather is the cause. !d. 
119 See generally In re Singer, supra note 53; see Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13. 
120 See In re Singer, supra note 53, at 101. The PSC never stated this was their real 
reason, but one could imagine the PSC found themselves under considerable 
pressure from utility companies to assert their jurisdiction and limit Singer's 
applicability. 
It I Id. at 101. 
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limit potential liability. 122 All of the Maryland utilities submitted comments 
to the PSC on these issues, with BG&E and PEPCO vehemently fighting 
against any LIC limitations. 123 PEPCO even submitted a proposed change to 
their LIC tariff, allowing liability only for "intentional misconduct," a higher 
level than the Singer court's interpretation of gross negligence. 124 
The utilities' efforts paid off, and the PSC ruled any LICs were valid as 
long as they were "reasonable," declining to create any uniform standard. 12S 
The PSC decision deferred limiting the scope of reasonableness to the 
utilities themselves. 126 Instead, the PSC found each company's unique 
operations required each LIC to be tailored to the company's needs.127 The 
decision found that utility companies were best suited to interpret what their 
LICs meant, making Singer's judicial interpretations irrelevant due to the 
PSC's authority. 128 
While the PSC did not directly overturn Singer, its ruling demonstrates 
that the PSC believes Maryland's affordability goal substantially outweighs 
any SRQ initiatives.129 Singer would give utility companies a reason, albeit 
small, to upgrade systems and implement procedures to maximize SRQ 
ratings in order to escape any liability.l30 However, the PSC's decision 
indicates that even the most protective LICs would be upheld, and SRQ 
standards would not be a major concern as long power companies minimized 
their rates. 131 Even more concerning was that the PSC essentially gave 
power companies full power to interpret what constitutes a "reasonable" LIC, 
and where this boundary falls. l32 The PSC asserted that "gross negligence" 
would not be covered by an LIC, but strongly suggested that the Singer 
decision did not find such level of negligence. 133 Thus, gross negligence for 
122 !d. at 93. The PSC's regulatory authority allows the Commission to review utility 
actions and issue regulatory orders. See id.; see generally MD. CODE REGS. 
20.50.07.05 (2011). 
123 In re Singer, supra note 53, at 93-94. 
124Id. at 104. Under the ruling, PEPCO would be allowed to adopt such language in 
its LIC, as long as it was reasonable. !d. at 105. However, PEPCO withdrew the 
request before the PSC made its decision. Id. 
125 See id. at 105. 
126 See id. at 101. 
127 See id. Such factors requiring this approach included the different jurisdictions 
and needs of each company; the range in service areas and demands; and the fact that 
some companies served mUltiple jurisdictions that fell outside the state. Id. PEPCO 
is a Maryland utility that also serves Washington, D.C. 
128 See id. at 101-02. 
129 See In re Singer, supra note 53, at 104, 105. 
130 See Singer, 79 Md. App. at 469, 478, 558 A.2d at 423, 428. 
\31 See In re Singer, supra note 53, at 101. 
132 See id. at 105. 
133 See id. at 104; see Singer, 79 Md. App. at 480,558 A.2d at 428. 
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utilities is a higher standard than the term's traditional meaning, and has been 
interpreted to mean "intentionally.,,134 
The decision also allowed PEPCO to create an incredibly rsrotective LIC, 
one that allowed damages only for "intentional misconduct.,,1 5 This PEPCa 
standard obscures the line between what is and is not reasonable. 136 Giving 
the utilities full interpretative power severely limited Maryland courts' role 
in any utility negligence claims, offering little legal recourse for damaged 
Maryland consumers. 
C. Gross Liability After In re Singer 
Two recent cases highlight how the PSC's order limits the judiciary's role 
in current utility damage claims. 137 The first case, Maryland Jockey Club of 
Baltimore City v. BG&E ("Jockey Club"), found that the PSC essentially 
declared Singer no longer good law. 138 Jockey Club ruled that the PSC 
required finding the electric company acted with "intentional" negligence, 
and that the PSC's ruling bound the court.139 Jockey Club applied this 
interpretation to the same BG&E tariff interpreted in Singer, highlighting the 
judiciary's deference to the PSC. 140 Jockey Club found that under the tariff 
and the PSC's public policy considerations, the "gross negligence" turned on 
whether the utility actually intended to cause harm by failing to act 
correctly. 141 Even though Jockey Club is unreported, it highlights how 
hesitant courts are to find gross negligence after the PSC's ruling, all but 
closing the door to any realistic legal relief for injured Maryland 
consumers. 142 
A 1999 decision, Premier Parks, Inc. v. BG&E ("Premier Parks"), comes 
from Maryland's federal district court, and deals with the same BG&E tariff 
134 See Md. Jockey Club ofBalt. City, Inc. v--Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 2002 WL 
32123994, at *3-5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (unreported case); see Premier Parks, 
Inc., 37 F. Supp. 2d 732 at 735-37. 
135 See In re Singer, supra note 53, at 104-05. 
136 See id. 
137 See Jockey Club, 2002 WL 32123994 at *3-5; see Premier Parks, 37 F. Supp. 2d 
at 735. The fact that these two cases and Singer make up the Maryland case law 
handling power company liability for outages shows how few cases even make it to 
court. 
138 See Jockey Club, 2002 WL 32123994 at *5. Jockey Club is an unreported 2002 
case from the Maryland Court of Special Appeals. While the case is merely 
persuasive authority, it best shows the high standard set for utility negligence cases 
after the PSC invalidated Singer. 
139 See id. 
140 See id. at *3. 
141 See id. at * 1 O. 
142 See id. at *10; see In re Singer, supra note 53, at 92. 
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LIC addressed in Singer. 143 The plaintiff alleged the LIC's language should 
be treated as ambiguous and given to a fact-finder. l44 However, Premier 
Parks relies on both Singer and the PSC's ruling to find that Singer settled 
the meaning of the LIC. 145 The Court did not find the PSC overruled or 
invalidated Singer, showing that conflicting judicial interpretations over 
Singer's applicability remained. l46 Nevertheless, Premier Parks failed to 
clearly define when a utility acts with "gross negligence.,,147 
IV. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ESQR: STRICT NEW POLICY OR 
F ATALL Y FLAWED LEGISLA nON? 
A. Pre-ESQR Maryland Statutes Regarding Utility Service 
Interruption 
The previously addressed Maryland court cases did not involve weather-
related outages, and therefore did not explain what actions a utility would be 
required to take under those circumstances. 148 There is a simple explanation 
for this: some utilities' LICs explicitly bar any actions for weather-related 
outages. 149 Coupled with this is the fact that weather events are unlikely to 
involve "§ross negligence," because power companies cannot control the 
weather. 15 However, Maryland statutes and regulations do require certain 
procedures and standards for responding to weather-related outages. 151 The 
question is whether these regulations are enough to combat unnecessarily 
long outages, or if they could possibly provide a baseline for gross 
negligence cases? 
The Code of Maryland Regulations ("CO MAR") requires electric utilities 
suffering from storm-caused outages to restore power as quickly as the 
·r 
143 See Premier Parks, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 734-35; see Jockey Club, 2002 WL 
32123994 at *3; cf Singer, 79 Md. App. at 477,558 A.2d at 427. 
144 See Premier Parks, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 735. . 
145 See id. at 735-36 (citing Singer, 79. Md. App. at 477,480,558 A.2d at 427). 
146 See Premier Parks, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 736. It should also be noted that neither of 
these two cases dealt with weather-related outages. 
147 See id. at 737. The court spent little time addressing what gross negligence would 
actually be, or what facts would be required, and instead states that only ordinary 
negligence took place. 
148 See Jockey Club, 2002 WL 32123994, at *9; see Premier Parks, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 
737; see Singer, 79 Md. App. at 480,558 A.2d at 428. 
149 See Singer, 79 Md. App. at 477,558 A.2d at 427 (quoting § 2.5 ofBG&E's 
Electrical Service Tariff). 
ISO See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1395; see In re Singer, supra note 53, at 102; see 
Jockey Club, 2002 WL 32123994, at *5. 
lSI See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. Cos. § 5-303 (West 2011); see MD. CODE REGS. 
20.50.12.13 (2012); see MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.07.07 (2011); see MD. CODE REGS. 
20.50.12.06 (2012); see MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.01.03B (2011). 
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circumstances reasonably allow. 152 Companies also must file a report with 
the PSC at the start of a "major outage event," detailing the number of 
affected customers and an estimated restoration time. 153 All utilities must 
file a post-major storm report within three weeks of a storm's end, 
documenting how many outages occurred and what preparations were 
taken. 154 After such an event, the PSC may review the utilities' responses 
and make recommendations, either on their own accord or in response to 
consumer complaints. ISS 
The problem with these regulations springs from their lack of clear 
definitions and varying levels of utility compliance. 156 For example, 
COMAR defines what constitutes a "major storm" as a weather-related event 
resulting in service interruptions to either ten percent or one hundred 
thousand of a utility's customers for more than twenty-four hours. 157 Power 
companies should be able to determine when this threshold has been met on 
their own; but PEPCO and BG&E failed to file such reports before or after 
the 2010 blizzards that left 236,000 BG&E customers and over 300,000 
PEPCO customers without power for multiple days. 158 
Additionally, the reporting requirement for companies to submit response 
plans "at the onset of a storm," lacks clarity and efficiency. 159 COMAR does 
152 MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.07.05A (2011). 
153 See id. at 20.50.07.05B(1)(A). 
154 See MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.12.13 (2012). 
155 The 2010 snowstorm response shows a PSC review due to customer complaints. 
See In the Matter of an Investigation Into the Reliability and Quality of the Elec. 
Dist. Servo of Potomac Elec. Power Co., Md. P.S.c. Order 83552, at 443 (Aug. 26, 
2010) (hereinafter "PEPCO Snow Response Order"). For an example of a post-
storm PSC Review that is not in response to complaints, see generally In reo Elec. 
Servo Interruptions Due to Hurricane/Tropical Storm Isabel and the Thunderstorms 
of Aug. 26-28, 2003, 95 Md. P.S.c. 62 (2004) (hereinafter In re Isabel). 
156 See PEPCO Snow Response Order, supra note 156 (highlighting PEPCO's 
delayed compliance in responding to previous PSC orders). 
157 MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.01.03B (2011); see In the Matter of an Investigation Into 
the Performance of Uti Is. During the Snow Storms Between the Period Feb. 5 
Through Feb. 12,2010, Md. P.S.C. Order 83173 (Feb. 25,2010) (hereinafter "Snow 
Storm Report Order"). 
158 See Snow Storm Report Order, supra note 158, at 1; see Joe Stephens and Aaron 
M. Davis, Pepco Defends Post-Storm Efforts at Hearings, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 
2010, at 2, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-
dynicontentiarticle/2010108/17/AR2010081705868.html; see Joe Stephens, Pepco 
Struggles to End Power Outages, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2011, at 1, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.comllocaUpepco-struggles-to~end-power­
outages/2011101l30/AB3RDME_story.html. COMAR requires electric companies 
to maintain service interruption records that include the amount and duration of the 
outages, which should allow utilities to easily determine when the definition of a 
"major storm" is met. See MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.07.05D (2011). 
159 See MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.07.05B(a)(1)(2012). None of the PSC orders or 
reviews mentions if any Maryland utilities filed "onset" reports, or when such a 
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not require these "onset" reports to detail what preparations the utility made, 
or if the filing mandate arises only when pre-existing outages are present.160 
The regulations do not require specific preparations for storms. 161 
Companies may be fined and ordered to make changes by the PSC, but these 
rare sanctions come long after the outages take place. 162 It doesn't appear 
that COMAR offers any potential legal or regulatory relief for beleaguered 
customers. 163 The regulations also fail to provide strong deterrents for slow 
restoration and ill-prepared companies, even though the state protects these 
utilities from traditional disincentives. l64 The question remains: how is the 
current regulatory system benefitting Maryland residents from utility abuses? 
B. Setting the Stage for Consumer Outrage 
One key reason for a lack of Maryland legislative action regarding 
electric service reliability could be that there was insignificant consumer 
demand for such changes before 2009. 165 The PSC noted utilities responded 
well to the outages caused by 2003 's Hurricane Isabel, improving upon past 
report would be mandated. See In re Isabel, supra note 156, at 62; see Snow Storm 
Report Order, supra note 158 at 1-2; see PEPCO Snow Response Order, supra note 
156, at 1. 
160 See MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.07.05B (2012). 
161 See MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.07.05 (2012). 
162 See Joe Stephens, Maryland Public Service Commission fines Pepco $1 million, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2011, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.comllocallmaryland-pub lic-service-commission -fines-
pepco-1-million/20 11112/21/gIQAwRiz90 _ story.html; see, e.g., In re Isabel, supra 
note 156, at 62. The Isabel review came almost one year after Hurricane Isabel 
struck Maryland. See id. The P.S.C. did not make a final decision or levy fines on 
PEPCO for the outages during the February, 2010 Blizzards until December, 2011. 
See In re Isabel, supra note 156, at 62. Additionally, PSC decisions rarely levy such 
fines and tend to focus on recommendations instead of mandatory actions that will 
improve response time. See In re Isabel, supra note 156, at 62, 66. 
163 MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.07.05 (2011); MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.12.13 (2012); MD. 
CODE REGS. 20.50.12.06 (2012); MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.01.03B (2011). 
164 See MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.07.05 (2011); see MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.12.06 
(2012); see MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.12.13 (2012); see MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.01.03B 
(2011). Such protections are thought to be the basic reasoning behind allowing such 
natural monopolies to take place. See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1390-91. More 
traditional protections from utility negligence would be legal action and market 
choice for consumers. See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1391, 1393. Cooperatives do not 
truly offer "market choice," as part of the customers' rates goes to paying the "host" 
utility. See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1408. 
165 None of the reports found demonstrated any such demands from Maryland 
residents, or indicated a large number of complaints to the PSC or State Legislators. 
See In re Isabel, supra note 156, at 66. 
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performances. 166 2003-2009 brought a relatively calm period of weather. 167 
However, the 2009-2010 winter forced Maryland consumers to re-evaluate 
their viewpoints on whether the current system really worked. 168 
The first blizzard, nicknamed the "Snowpocolypse," dumped a record 
fifteen inches of snow on the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area days 
before the Christmas holiday.169 The fast-falling, thick, wet snow came with 
plenty of warning: local meteorologists warned of a major winter weather 
event seventy-two hours prior to the storm's onset. l7O The wet snow caused 
power outages across the region, mostly from trees falling onto electric 
wires, and paralyzed the region days before the Christmas holiday.171 While 
the outages did not reach significant levels, many transportation offices and 
Virginia's Dominion Power Company took the storm as an opportunity to 
review their internal blizzard response plans. 172 
Unfortunately, the December 2009 storm was winter's warm-up act for a 
Mid-Atlantic assault. 173 In early February, meteorologists began forecasting 
166 See In re Isabel, supra note 156, at 3 (noting improved responses in comparison 
to utility restoration stemming 1997's Hurricane Floyd). 
167 Jason Samenow, Amazing Mid-Atlantic Snow Statistics, WASH. POST: CAPITAL 
WEATHER GANG BLOG (Feb. 12,2010,12:30 PM), 
voices. washingtonpost.coml capitalweathergang/20 1 0102/amazing_ mid-
atlantic_snow_stat.html (showing no major winter storms between 2003-2009). 
168 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 4. 
169 Va. Div. of Energy Reg. Spec. Rep., Preparation for and Response to the 
December 2009 Snowstorm, VA. STATE CORP. COMM'N, at 3-4 (Aug. 2010). The 
blizzard was actually a Nor'easter, a common weather phenomenon in the Mid-
Atlantic with forty mph winds during the storm, and caused the D.C. Metro subway 
system to close all aboveground stations. The blizzard also shut down the Federal 
Government. Ashley Halsey III, Sandya Somashekar, Josh White, Washington's Big 
Dig, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2009), available at ttp:llwww.washingtonpost.comlwp-
dynicontentiarticle12009112/20/AR2009122001153.html. The Snowpocolypse 
caused Maryland, Virginia, and D.C. to declare states of emergency. Va. Div. of 
Energy Reg. Spec. Rep., at 4. 
170 See Tim Ballisty, Snow Totals Adding Upfrom Blizzard 2009, The Weather 
Channel.com (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.weather.comloutlooklweather-
news/news/articles/winter-storm-aiming-for-mid-atlantic _ 2009-12-17. 
171 See Va. Div. of Energy Reg. Spec. Rep., supra note 170, at 1. 
172 See generally Va. Div. of Energy Reg. Spec. Rep., supra note 170 (providing 
overall analysis of Virginia power company's response to storm). The storm caused 
approximately 1.5 million power outages on the East Coast. Va. Div. of Energy 
Reg. Spec. Reg., supra note 170, at 4-5. Virginia's Dominion Power had over 1,500 
outages in Northern Virginia. CBS News: Major Storm Bears Down on Mid-
Atlantic, CBS NEWS (Dec. 20, 2009, 7:50 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.comlstories/2009/ 121 18/nationallmain599654 2. shtml. 
Maryland companies did not submit a major outage event report for this storm, and 
no figures were available. 
173 See Jason Samenow, Forecast: Major Snowstorm poised to strike, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 4, 201010:40 AM), 
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for another major blizzard ("the 2010 Snowmaggedon Blizzard,,).174 Two 
days before this second blizzard hit, weather reports alarmingly predicted 
that a third blizzard would come just days after the second one, resulting in 
approximately three feet of snow falling on the D.C. area. 175 Residents 
flocked to the stores to stock up, the Federal government shut down, and the 
region readied itself for this historic snow event. 176 
Most area utilities also prepared for the storm, knowing widespread 
outages would occur.177 Virginia's Dominion Power moved internal crews 
up to Northern Virginia the day before the storm, and called in an additional 
200 outside subcontractors. 178 BG&E requested 400 extra crewmembers the 
day of the storm.179 PEPCO did not make any requests until a second BG&E 
call went out after the storm began. ISO As a result, PEPCO mounted a 
severely crippled response, especially in comparison to Dominion and 
BG&E. 181 Dominion and BG&E's service areas are not only larger than 
PEPCO's, but also include more rural and isolated areas. I82 Some angry 
PEPCO customers found themselves waiting in the cold for over a week. 183 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/capitalweathergang/20 1 0/02/forecast_ another _ maj 
or weekend.html. 
174 Deborah Tedford, East Coast Digs Out From Record Snow, NPR, (Feb. 10,2010 
5:05 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=123558638. 
175 See Jason Samenow, Remembering 2010 's Snoverkill, WASH. POST CAPITAL 
WEATHER GANG BLOG, (Feb. 9, 2011,11:45 AM), http:// 
voices. washingtonpost.com/ capi talweathergang/20 11 /02/remem bering_ snoverkill.ht 
ml. The third and final blizzard, nicknamed "Snoverkill", resulted in whiteout 
conditions and an additional twenty inches of snow falling in twelve hours. Id. 
176 See Carol Morello & Ashley Halsey, III, Historic Snowstorm in D.C. Leaves a 
Mess to be Reckoned with, WASH. POST, (Feb. 7, 20 I 0), available at 
http://www .washingtonposLcom/wp-
dynlcontentlarticle/20 I 0/02/06/ AR20 1 0020600683.html. 
177 Mary Pat Flaherty, In Storm, Pepco Last to Seek Aid, WASH. POST, (Jan. 28, 
2011), available at http://www.washingtonposLcom/national/in-storm-pepeco-last-
to-seek-aidl2011/01l27/ABTi4LE_story.html. 
178 See Flaherty, supra note 178. 
179 See Flaherty, supra note 178. 
180 See Flaherty, supra note 178. 
181 See Flaherty, supra note 178. 
182 See PEPCO.COM, New Construction: Service Map, PEPCO.COM, 
http://www.pepco.com/business/services/new/map/ (last accessed Jan. 15,2012) 
(showing that PEPCO serves D.C. and Maryland's Montgomery and Prince 
George's Counties); see Virginia Energy Patterns and Trends, VIRGINIA TECH, 
http://www.energy.vt.eduiveptielectric/serviceareas.asp (last accessed Jan. 14,2011) 
(showing that Dominion Power, a.k.a. Virginia Power, serves Arlington, Fairfax, 
Prince William, Stafford, and Fauquier Counties, and the Cities of Alexandria, Falls 
Church, Fairfax, and Fredericksburg). 
183 See Andrew Gully, Blizzards Shut Down Washington, Boston and New York on 
the United States Eastern Seaboard, THE HERALD SUN (Feb. 11,2010 8:23 AM), 
http://www.heraldsun.com.aulnews/victorialblizzards-shut-down-washington-
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Families found themselves forced to evacuate their homes due to freezing 
temperatures. l84 A Washington Post investigation reported PEPCO's failure 
to prepare for the storms, resulting in an outpouring of criticism from furious 
PEPCO customers. 185 PEPCO not being held responsible for its lackluster 
preparation was a common theme of consumer outrage. 186 The Post's 
investigation also revealed that the PSC previously failed to act on PEPCO's 
already poor ranking for service reliability.187 Maryland residents found 
themselves unable to trust the PSC, and demanded legislative action. 188 
These snowstorms did more than highlight PEPCO's ill-preparedness and 
the PSC's lack of preventative action. 189 For decades, Maryland's primary 
utility goal focused on affordability.190 The General Assembly sought to 
protect lower-income and vulnerable populations from heightened financial 
hardship by keeping electricity rates as low as possible.1 91 However, the 
week-plus power outages harmed these populations the most. 192 Lower-
income families may lack the financial resources to restock a refrigerator 
after its contents spoi1. 193 They also may be less likely to have medical 
insurance to cover illnesses caused by spoiled food. 194 Low-income and 
federally-assisted persons are less likely to have the resources to relocate, 
boston -and-new-york -on-the-uni ted-states-eastem-seaboardl story-e6frf71 f-
1225829029847. 
184 See Flaherty, supra note 178. 
185 See Flaherty, supra note 178. 
186 See Flaherty, supra note 178; see also Hamil R. Harris, Editorial, Prince 
George's Officials Grill Pepco, WASH. POST, (Aug. 20, 2011,12:08 PM), 
http://voices.washingtonpost.comllocal-breaking-news/crime-and-public-
safety/pepco-president-thomas-graham.html. 
187 See Flaherty, supra note 178 (reporting that before the storms, the PSC knew 
PEPCa ranked as one of the worst electric providers in the United States). The PSC 
had acted after the 2009 snowstorm by opening an investigation. See Flaherty, supra 
note 178. These events spurred the original creation of the ESQR, prior to the 2010 
snowstorms. See Flaherty, supra note 178. 
188 See Flaherty, supra note 178; see Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, discussing 
the 2010 snowstorms as the catalyst for passing ESQR. 
189 See Flaherty, supra note 178. 
190 See infra, Part II(d) for discussion on Maryland's affordability goal. 
191 See In re Singer, supra note 53, at 101. 
192 See Stephens, supra note 1 (detailing families keeping warm with blankets); see 
Flaherty, supra note 178 (reporting medically disabled people explaining their 
evacuation from powerless homes); Editorial, Why Pepco Cannot Keep the Lights 
On, WASH. POST, Dec. 5,2010, available at http://www.justicefirst.org/nationaliin-
the-medialwhy-pepco-cant-keep-lights-on.html. 
193 See CDC.Gov: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE, 
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/disasters/poweroutage/needtoknow.asp. Even though it was 
winter, some homes were warmer than the recommended refrigeration and storage 
temperature for perishable foods. See id. Local health authorities urged residents to 
throwaway all perishables. Id. 
194 See id. 
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especially when local public transportation is suspended. 195 Elderly and 
disabled persons, that relied on electricity for medical needs, found 
themselves stranded. 196 Furthermore, the additional costs from the storm 
outages, including lost wages due to closed businesses, quickly added Up.197 
PEPCO announced it would need to raise rates to pay for repairs. 198 Thus, 
the storms revealed the current policy's biggest flaw: more service 
interruptions result in higher overall costs for consumers, and hurt the very 
1 · h 1· k 199 popu atlOns t e po ICY wor s to protect. 
C. An In-Depth Look at the ESQR 
The Maryland General Assembly passed the Maryland Electricity Service 
Quality and Reliability Act on May 10, 2011, a little over a year after 
PEPCO's disastrous performance created a consumer and voter backlash?OO 
While ESQR's formal introduction came before the January blizzards, the 
storms certainly helped provide momentum for the bill's passage. 201 
Legislators directly cited complaints against PEPCO as a motivating factor 
that influenced their vote. 202 Both lawmakers and Governor O'Malley touted 
ESQR as a solution that would raise reliability rates and allow the PSC to 
punish utilities falling below the acceptable threshold.203 
ESQR's language targets both utilities and the PSc. 204 The statute 
requires the PSC to establish an individual standard of SRQ for each utility 
company.205 Interestingly, the law continues the established policy against 
implementing blanket rules and standards on electric companies.206 Despite 
ESQR's lack of uniform standards, the statute requires the creation of 
195 See Morello & Halsey, supra note 177. 
196 See Flaherty, supra note 178. 
197 See Morello & Halsey, supra note 177. The Federal Government and many area 
businesses remained closed, partially due to lack of electricity. Id. 
198 See Flaherty, supra note 178. 
199 See generally Flaherty, supra note 178. 
200 See MD. ELEC. SERVo QUALITY AND RELIABILITY ACT, supra note 14; see Bill to 
Penalize Utilities if They Fall Below Standards, WBAL-TV, Feb. 4,2011, supra 
note 14. 
201 See MD. ELEC. SERvo QUALITY AND RELIABILITY ACT, supra note 14; see Bill to 
Penalize Utilities if They Fall Below Standards, WBAL-TV, Feb. 4,2011, supra 
note 14. 
202 See MD. ELEC. SERvo QUALITY AND RELIABILITY ACT, supra note 14; see 
WBAL-TV, supra note 14. , 
203 See Bill to Penalize Utilities if They Fall Below Standards, WBAL-TV, Feb. 4, 
2011, supra note 14. 
204 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 1. 
205 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 2; see MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. 
§ 7-213(b),(d) (West 2011). 
206 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 2; see, e.g., In re Singer, supra note 53, 
at 101 (ruling against blanket standards for all electric companies). 
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specific qualifications for each utility's SQR.207 The PSC must base their 
systems on one of three nationally recognized SQR indexes?08 The PSC also 
must set specific standards regarding a company's vegetation management, 
downed wire repair, and service interruption response.209 Individual systems 
should be tailored to fit the utility's current infrastructure, customer bank, 
and the utility's service area.210 All of these systems must be in place by July 
1,2012.2II 
ESQR mandates annual SQR reporting for all utilities. 212 COMAR only 
required utilities to submit reports to the PSC during or after a "major storm" 
event. 213 These regulations gave utilities substantial discretion under 
COMAR, which resulted in companies failing to report outages after 
catastrophic storms.214 This lack of reporting delayed any PSC opinion 
regarding a utility's response, as the PSC would have to order companies to 
submit the required reports with all the necessary information.215 Under 
ESQR, the annual reporting requirement ensures that utilities will not be able 
to conceal outage information indefinitely.216 All in all, the review mandates 
provide a much-needed level of transparency to utility operations and SQR 
levels. 
Perhaps most significantly, ESQR calls for the PSC to automatically 
review each utility's SQR performance, and a utility's failure to comply with 
the ESQR may be punished via monetary penalties and sanctions. 217 
Furthermore, utilities may not attempt to recoup the costs of any such 
corrective action from any of their customers, a protective measure installed 
207 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 2; see MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. 
§ 7-213(e) (West 2011). 
208 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 2; see MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. 
§ 7-213(d) (West 2011). 
209 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 2; see MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. 
§ 7-213(e)(l)(i) (West 2011). 
210 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 2; see MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. 
§ 7-213(e)(2) (West 2011). 
211 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 7-213(d) (West 2011). 
212 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 2; see MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. 
§ 7-213(g) (West 2011). 
213 See infra at Part J(d) for discussion on the COMAR definition of a "major storm"; 
see MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.07.058 (2012); see MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.01.038 
(2011). 
214 See MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.01.038 (2011). For examples of non-compliance, see 
PEPCO Snow Response Order, supra note 156; Snowstorm Report Order, supra 
note 158. 
215 See generally Stephens, supra note 163 (detailing the PSC rulings regarding 
PEPCO's storm response, almost two years after the storms). 
216 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 2; see MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. 
§ 7-213(g) (West 2011). 
217 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 2; see MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. 
§ 7-213(f)(2)(ii) (West 2011). See supraat Part? for discussion relating to PSC's 
lack of punitive authority under current regulations. 
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to keep affordability maximized and avoid any incentives for non-
compliance.218 Previously, the regulations pushed the PSC into an advisory 
role.219 After major storm events, the PSC made only suggestions and 
recommendations, appearing to lack the power to force change.220 By giving 
the PSC stronger punitive tools, the General Assembly sent.a message to 
Maryland citizens that the PSC would look out for consumers, not just 
utilities. 
In fact, the ESQR explicitly states in section (b): "It is the goal of this 
state that each electric company provide its customers with high levels of 
service quality and reliability ... ,,221 The importance of this dramatic policy 
change cannot be missed.222 Previously, the state's primary goal centered on 
affordability over SQR, and the utilities successfully avoided by threatening 
rate-hikes when unfavorable SQR measures arose. 223 While ESQR 
specifically notes that cost-effective SQR programs are best, it makes it clear 
that the one-sided argument that SQR would harm consumers is no longer 
acceptable. 224 Some balancing is required, and an electric company with 
sub-standard SQR ratings can be held accountable.225 
V. ANALYSIS OF THE ESQR's REAL-WORLD IMPACT ON UTILITY 
STORM RESPONSES 
The ESQR's design focuses on preventing Maryland consumers from 
undergoing long and unnecessary power outages due to poor maintenance 
and storm planning.226 It is thus important to ask whether the ESQR would 
prevent another post-Snowmaggeden scenario. Many consumers focused on 
the response times between Virginia and Maryland electric companies.227 
218 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 2; see MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. 
§ 7-2l3(f)(2)(iii) (West 2011). Maryland's primary goal of afford ability is 
addressed in In re Singer, supra note 53, at 101. 
219 See MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.07.05B (2012); see Snow Stann Report Order, supra 
note 158. 
220 See PEPCO Snow Response Order, supra note 157; see In re Isabel, 95 Md. 
P.S.c. at 3. 
221 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 7-213(b) (West 2011). 
222 See id. 
223 See supra Part II (c) for discussion on Maryland's policy. 
224 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note l3, at 2. 
225 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 2. The language also indirectly instructs 
the PSC to evaluate its mission, in order to comply with the new policy. Fiscal 
Policy Note, supra note 13, at 2. 
226 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 7-213(b) (West 2011). 
227 See Tucker Echols, Confidence in Pepco Slumps, Dominion Gains, WASH. 
BUSINESS J., (Apr. 20, 2011, 1 :49 PM), 
http://www.bizjoumals.com/washingtoninews/20 111. 
04/19/ confidence-in-pepco-slumps-dominion.html. 
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This comparison calls for a brief analysis of Virginia's regulations, and 
looking at how key differences required Virginia utilities' fast response time. 
A. Virginia's Pro-Reliability Policy and Regulations 
The 2009-10 snowstorms highlighted how Virginia's power companies 
responded far better to major storm events and outages. 22 Both Dominion 
Power and PEPCa suffered widespread outages, but Dominion Power had 
all lights restored within two days of the second storm's end.229 PEPCa took 
over a week to restore services.230 Local media and consumers asked why 
such a difference existed.231 A comparison of each state's legal standards 
reveals different policy goals playa role in answering this question. 
Virginia's State Corporation Commission ("SCC") oversees the 
Commonwealth's regulated energy utilities. 232 Unlike Maryland's PSC, 
Virginia grants the SCC a large amount of regulatory and jUdiciary power, 
including a large amount of oversight over outage response plans. 233 The 
SCC's power includes requiring utilities to submit their emergency response 
procedures so that the SCC may ensure proper plans exist before such an 
emergency arises.234 During an emergency, the SCC may require a utility 
take certain actions.235 The Virginia Governor also can force utilities to 
provide electricity to other areas during certain emergencies.236 All of these 
provisions keep a large amount of control reserved for the state, and allow 
the government to step in and force action if power companies fail to respond 
adequately.237 
Furthermore, Virginia's policies differ from that of Maryland in that 
Virginia electric companies have a statutory duty to provide reasonably 
reliable service at affordable rates.238 Until the ESQR's passage, Maryland 
lacked a similar policy.239 The SCC also has the power to determine that a 
utility failed to fulfill this duty through consumer complaints alone, and the 
228 See Echols, supra note 228. 
229 See Flaherty, supra note 178; see Stephens, supra note 1. 
230 See Flaherty, supra note 178; see Stephens, supra note 1. 
231 See Flaherty, supra note 178; see Stephens, supra note 1. 
232 See VA. CODE ANN. § 56-35 (West 2012). 
233 See id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 56-250 (West 2012); see VA. CODE ANN. § 56-249 
(West 2012). 
234 VA. CODE ANN. § 56-586.1 (West 2012). 
235 E-mail from KennethJ. Schrad,Dir. ofInformation Resources, Va. SCC, 
Response to Author's Questionnaire (Jan. 18,2012) (on file with author); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 56-250 (West 2012). 
236 See VA. CODE ANN. § 56-586.1 (West 2012). 
237 See id.; VA. CODE ANN. § 56-250 (West 2012). 
238 See generally supra at Part II, (c), for Maryland's policies favoring affordability; 
see VA. CODE ANN. § 56-234.4 (West 2011); see VA. CODE ANN. § 56-234 (West 
2011). 
239 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. Cos. § 7-213(b)-(d) (West 2011). 
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see can use this finding to compel operational or other changes?40 Not only 
does this statute give the see the teeth to enforce the duty, but also allows 
consumer complaints to show a utility has not met their dUty.241 Virginia 
utilities thus have a strong incentive for high customer satisfaction rates. 
In fact, Virginia's see has authority to review a power company's SRQ 
ratings even before a customer complaint is filed. 242 The Virginia legislature 
grants the see general oversight powers over utilities' service 
performance. 243 The see may, at any time, request a utility to submit an 
SRQ report to them, and investigates every consumer complaint made to the 
eommission.244 Additionally, the see reviews all utility res£onses to major 
storms that cause outages for longer than twenty four hours.2 5 The Virginia 
legislature thus ensured the see's oversight and control over utility SRQ 
levels would not be compromised by lack of authority or administrative 
power.246 
Virginia and Maryland also differ in their remedies for utility liability?47 
Like Maryland, Virginia gives the see jurisdiction over power companies, 
and grants them extensive remedial powers.248 Virginia and Maryland both 
allow their respective regulatory committees to act on consumer 
complaints.249 But Virginia specifically states that the see's judicial powers 
do not end an aggrieved consumer's common law rights.25o Nor maya 
utility's tariff purport to do so, although they can limit liability.251 This 
means a Virginia power customer is specifically not foreclosed from seeking 
judicial relief, and can pursue damage claims through this avenue.252 
Virginia's regulatory system certainly provides strong incentives for 
utilities to minimize outages, through its remedy statutes and arming the 
see with expansive powers.253 These incentives, though rarely used, may 
240 See Schrad, supra note 236; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-6, 234. 
241 See Schrad, supra note 236; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-6, 234. 
242 VA. CODE ANN. § 56-249 (West 2011). 
243 See Schrad, supra note 236; VA. CODE ANN. §56-234.4 (West 2012). 
244 See Schrad, supra note 236; VA. CODE ANN. §56-234.4 (West 2012). 
245 See Schrad, supra note 236. 
246 See VA. CODE ANN. § 56-234.4 (West 2012). 
247 See In re Singer, supra note 53, at 105; see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-6,253 (West 
2011). 
248 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS., §§ 2-112, 113 (West 2011); see VA. CODE 
ANN. § 56-6 (West 2012). 
249 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS., § 3-102 (West 2011); see VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 56-6 (West 2012). 
250 VA. CODE ANN. § 56-7 (West 2011). 
251 Schrad, supra note 236; VA. CODE ANN. § 56-253 (West 2012). 
252 Schrad, supra note 236. While no Virginia case law showed such an action, 
perhaps these statutory provisions are Virginia's electric companies seem far more 
concerned with maintaining high SRQ rates. 
253 See Schrad, supra note 236; VA. CODE ANN., § 56-234.4 (West 2012); VA. CODE 
ANN., § 56-6,234 (West 2012). 
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explain why Virginia's power companies quickly restored power after the 
2011 blizzards.254 Virginia's approach highlights how strong SRQ policy 
initiatives ensure utilities undertake the necessary programs to prevent 
outages in the first place.255 
B. Comparing ESQR to Virginia's Regulations 
ESQR revolutionizes Maryland energy policy by promoting high SRQ 
satisfaction rates, much like Virginia's long-standing policies.256 Virginia's 
strong golicy initiatives likely play a major role in incentivizing utility 
action.27 Maryland adopted similarly forceful policy language in ESQR, 
focusing the entire statute on creating SRQ goals for Maryland electric 
utilities.258 This historical change uses mechanisms comparable to Virginia 
in determining SRQ standards, including the delineation of explicit 
enforcement powers to the PSC.259 
However, ESQR does not state whether the PSC can request major storm 
outage reports before initiating a hearing, as the SCC does?60 Historically, 
most utilities would not submit such reports until the PSC requested one 
during a Commission investigation.261 ESQR should have strengthened the 
reporting requirements allowing the PSC to adopt the SCC' s method of 
automatic review.262 
ESQR also lacks statutory guarantees of legal action for Maryland 
consumers. 263 Virginia customers have multiple routes for taking legal 
254 See Schrad, supra note 236. Mr. Schrad noted the SCC never used the 
emergency powers granted by VA. CODE ANN., § 56-250 (West 2012). 
255 See generally Rudy, supra note 17, at 1415. 
256 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 1; see VA. CODE ANN., § 56-6, 234 
(West 2012). 
257 See text accompanying note 250, supra. 
258 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 3-4; compare MD. CODE ANN., PUB. 
UTIL. COS. § 7-213 (West 2011), and VA. CODE ANN., § 56-234.4 (West 2011). 
259 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 2 (requiring use of national ranking 
systems and models, including SAIDI and SAIFI, for setting ESQR's standards); see 
also Schrad, supra note 236 (stating the SCC uses SAID! and SAIFI scores for 
determining SRQ goals). 
260 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13; compare MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. 
§ 7-213 (West 2011), with VA. CODE ANN., § 56-249 (West 2012). 
261 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 4-5; see PEPCO Snow Response Order, 
supra note 156 (where the PSC orders such a report after opening an investigation). 
PEPCa's outages certainly reached the level needed to trigger the major storm 
reporting requirement in MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.0 1.03B (2011), but PSC records 
show this regulation is not followed by utilities. 
262 Compare MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 7-213 (West 2011), with VA. CODE 
ANN., § 56-249 (West 2012). 
263 Compare MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 7-213 (West 2011), with VA. CODE 
ANN., § 56-253 (West 2012) (forbidding Virginia utilities from attempting to limit 
consumer common law actions). 
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action, although it is unclear whether Virginians utilize the judicial course?64 
While Virginia's remedy laws may not be practicable, they have some 
deterrent effect by creating another incentive for utilities to keep customers 
happy.265 
Finally, Virginia grants the SCC extensive emergency powers, while 
ESQR did not extend such authority to the PSC.266 Much like Virginia's 
remedy laws, these emergency powers may be more pretense than 
practice?67 But, giving such expansive authority could encourage the PSC to 
adopt a more aggressive approach in utility regulation.268 ESQR's policy 
provisions underline the General Assembly's intended shift in focus to 
protecting consumers, and hold the PSC to this view.269 Given the PSC's 
history, a clear delegation of emergency powers may encourage such 
h . I b h . 270 C anges m regu atory e aVlOr. 
C. Storm Response and Utility Preparation Requirements Under 
ESQR 
ESQR will likely help raise SRQ ratings for Maryland utilities, and 
represents a clear shift in longstanding energy policy.271 This change, while 
long overdue, should help create greater customer satisfaction and relations 
with utilities.272 
However, ESQR fails to resolve known problems. COMAR's vague 
storm outage reporting requirements still stand, seemingly unchanged by 
ESQR.273 Moreover, ESQR does not establish automatic punishments for 
utilities that fail to adequately respond to storm-related outages.274 While 
automatic punishments do not allow for case-by-case determinations, they 
264 See VA. CODE ANN., § 56-6 (West 2012); see also Schrad, supra note 236. 
265 See Schrad, supra note 236. Mr. Schrad noted that many of Virginia's pro-SRQ 
enforcement provisions had not been utilized. Id. 
266 See VA. CODE ANN., §§ 56-250, 586.1 (West 2012); see MD. CODE ANN., PUB. 
UTIL. COS. § 7-213 (West 2011). 
267 Schrad, supra note 236. The SCC noted these emergency powers, established in 
response to the 1970's energy crisis, have never been used. !d. 
268 See, e.g., Rudy, supra note 17, at 1413-15. 
269 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 7-213 (West 2011); see also Fiscal Policy 
Note, supra note 13, at 1-2. 
270 See, e.g., infra Part V(c) (reflecting the previous PSC policy favoring utility 
interests) . 
271 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13. 
272 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13. 
273 See MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.01.03B (2011). See supra Part III (c) for a discussion 
on the COMAR reporting requirement. 
274 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 7-213 (West 2011); see also Fiscal Policy 
Note, supra note 13. 
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create strong incentives for proper pre-storm preparations.275 ESQR also 
fails to address the problem of slow and prolonged PSC reviews after major 
storms caused outages.276 These tools would greatly hasten utility response, 
raise SRQ levels, and restore consumer faith in the PSC. 
The biggest variable in ESQR's future effectiveness does not stem from 
the Maryland General Assembly, but from the PSc. ESQR leaves a large 
amount of discretion to the PSC, which may undermine ESQR's effect on 
changing utility wactices if the PSC continues its highly protective stance 
towards utilities. 77 Historically, the PSC failed to stringently enforce storm 
preparation regulations, choosing instead to protect utilities from outside 
scrutiny.278 If ESQR is meant to prevent a repeat of the February 2010 
blackouts, the PSC must change their approach and become proactive in their 
enforcement of ESQR.279 This includes a possible reconsideration by the 
PSC of their 1991 Singer ruling.28o 
This concern may be unwarranted, as the PSC has already begun an 
administrative review of its rules and procedures relating to utility outages.281 
In December of 2011, the Commission issued an unprecedented $1,000,000 
fine against PEPCO for its failures in 2010, and continued to publicly 
criticize PEPCO's reliability ratings in 2012.282 These actions hint that the 
PSC itself is evolving.283 Regardless, the PSC must ensure that untimely 
delays in reviewing storm reports and responding to consumer complaints 
are minimized. 284 This includes clarifying regulations by adding strict 
enforcement mechanisms, and building certain mandatory reliability 
programs into the forthcoming individualized utility standards.285 While the 
$1,000,000 fine against PEPCO reflects the PSC's recognition of consumer 
outrage, the fine still came approximately two years after the blizzards.286 If 
utility companies know complaints will be swiftly reviewed by the PSC, they 
275 For an example of the rate-hike argument, see In re Singer, supra note 53. 
276 See PEPCO Snow Response Order, supra note 156; Snow Storm Report Order, 
surra note 158. 
27 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 7-213 (West 2011); see supra Part III(b) 
discussing previous PSC opinions and policies. 
278 See In re Singer, supra note 53, at 101. 
279 See generally id. at 101-05. 
280 Compare Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, with In re Singer, supra note 53. 
281 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 6. 
282 Stephens, supra note 159; see Victor Zapana and Aaron C. Davis, Pepco Receives 
Small Rate Hike in Maryland, WASH. POST, July 20, 2012, 
http://articles.washingtonpost.coml20 12-07 -20/1ocal/35486123 _l-'pepco-derecho-
storm-small-rate-hike. 
283 See Stephens, supra note 159; but cf In re Singer, supra note 53, at 105. 
284 See MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.01.03B (2011); see supra Part III (c) for a discussion 
on the COMAR reporting requirement. 
285 For example, requiring tree-trimming programs and targeted upgrades as part of a 
utility's ESQR goals would help ensure the legislative and policy goals behind 
ESQR are quickly met. 
286 See Zapana and Davis, supra note 284. 
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are more likely to be adequately prepared for stonns and outages. 287 
Therefore, the PSC should adopt a rigid review process, including fines for 
failing to appropriately respond to a PSC investigation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Two blizzards and days of freezing homes, tired families and consumer 
outrage lay the ground for ESQR's passage.288 The Act will help prevent 
another prolonged outage like the one PEPCO customers experienced in 
2010.289 Maryland utilities are now required to institute programs that will 
help prevent many future outages?90 More importantly, ESQR shows the 
General Assembly will act to hold utilities liable for massive post-stonn 
outages?91 
287 See supra Part II(c). 
288 See supra Part IV(c) for discussion ofESQR's passage. 
289 See supra Part IV(b) for discussion of the 2010 blizzards. 
290 PEPCO and BG&E instituted reliability improvement programs before ESQR's 
effective date ofJanuary 1,2013. PEPCO, Press Release, Maryland State 
Legislators Progress Report (Dec. 2012) available at 
http://www.pepco.coml_res/documentsIPEPCO%20MD%20REP%20PROGRESS% 
20RPT%20DEC2012.pdf; BGE, Tree & Vegetation Management, 
http://www.bge.comlcustomerservice/servicerequests/treetrimming/pages/default.asp 
x (last visited Feb. 8,2013). In October 2012, PEPCO's preparations and 
performance were lauded as a significant improvement after Hurricane Sandy dealt 
the D.C. area a glancing blow. J. Freedom du Lac, Annys Shin and Steve Hendrix, 
Inside Pepco: How the Utility Kept the Lights on During Hurricane Sandy, WASH. 
POST. Oct. 30, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.coml20 12-1 0-
30/loca1/35499547 _1-IJepco-holdings-hurricane-sandy-utility. PEPCO suffered 
approximately 42,000 outages, compared to Dominion Power's 81,000. Id. BG&E 
also reported a drop in service interruptions after Hurricane Sandy. Andrea K. 
Walker and Jamie Smith Hopkins, BGE Works to Restore Power to Thousands of 
Residents, BALT. SUN, Oct. 31,2012, http://articles.baltimoresun.coml2012-1O-
31lbusinesslbs-bz-sandy-power-outages-20 121 030_1_ bge-works-power-lines-
power-for-eight-days (BGE reported approximately 338,000 outages, a drop from 
over 750,000 outages during Hurricane Irene). 
291 PEPCO faced its first real challenge under the new ESQR requirements after a 
line of severe storms (known as a "derecho") hit the Washington D. C. metropolitan 
area on June 29, 2012. See Aaron C. Davis and Mary Pat Flaherty, Pepco Defends 
Its Response to Derecho Storm, Saying it 'Mobilized Quickly', WASH. POST, July 30, 
2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/20 12-07 -30/10ca1/35487619 _1-IJepco-
derecho-storm-outages. The derecho caused more than 440,000 PEPCO customers 
to lose electricity, with more than 229,403 customers experiencing an outage for 
more than seventy two hours. Huffington Post D.C., Pepco Power Restoration 
Efforts Under Fire from Customers, Politicians (Updated), The HUFFINGTON POST 
(last updated July 2, 2012, 11 :26 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.coml2012/07/02/dc-power-outages_n_1643652.htmI.It 
took a full week for PEPCO to restore power to all of its customers, and many 
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There are many differences between ESQR and Virginia's utility 
regulations. Maryland may not need to match Virginia's level of consumer 
protection, but ESQR allows Maryland to adopt similar provisions if 
necessary. ESQR makes one point clear: both Maryland and Virginia 
recognize that states and utilities must work together in order to keep the 
lights on. 
elected officials publicly criticized the slow response time. See id.; see Davis and 
Flaherty, Pepco Defends Its Response to Derecho Storm, Saying it 'Mobilized 
Quickly,' WASH. POST, July 30, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.comJ2012-07-
30/10cal/3 5487619 _1-IJepco-derecho-storm-outages. BG&E also received heavy 
criticism for its derecho response, and the PSC held a hearing on BG&E's reliability 
improvement plan in September of2012. See BALT. SUN, Editorial, Our View: the 
Light Goes On at BGE, Sept. 17,2012, http://articles.baltimoresun.comJ2012-09-
17/news/bs-ed-bge-20 120917_1_ derecho-storm-power-lines-underground-outages. 
BG&E reported over 750,000 outages after the derecho. Walker and Hopkins, supra 
note 292. 
